Timothy Ash (STANDARD BANK PLC)
Ukraine trip notes
We visited Ukraine on November 17-20 meeting with the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Pavlo Klimkin, the
Governor of the NBU, Valeria Gontareva, the deputy
Minister of Finance, Vitali Lissovenko,
alongside meeting the IMF, members of the diplomatic corps, business leaders,
journalists, corporates, banks and analysts.
Summary view: The political scene continues to be dominated by the on-going
conflict in Donbas, which shows little sign of abating. Indeed, the risks of
further escalation and a Russian military intervention are not insignificant.
The latter risks/concerns continue to strain the domestic political scene, acts
as a distraction to the economic policy debate, and undermines
economic confidence. Parliamentary elections brought a resounding victory for
pro-EU parties. However, squabbling between the two main reform parties appears
to have delayed the formation of a new reform coalition government. This latter
delay has further sapped confidence, and is likely to stall the release of much
needed Western financing. Concerns over security and political stability have
weighed on the UAH, and depleted scarce FX reserves still further. The UAH has
now lost close to half its value over the past year, and could well fall
further as evidence suggests deleveraging is reducing roll-over ratios on
USD45bn plus of short term debt liabilities, plus outright capital flight. The
weakening UAH threatens to boost NPLs in the banking sector, risks a
non-payment problem throughout the economy, and ultimately will increase the
cost to the sovereign balance sheet from the likely resulting bank recapitalisation. The existing USD17bn IMF programme now appears insufficient to close the external
financing gap, and may need to be significantly re-profiled and augmented -
perhaps increasing to USD30bn. Western creditors appear to be slow moving in recognising the scale of the problem, and are perhaps
nervous over rising public sector indebtedness (debt sustainability), domestic
political instability and the security situation on the ground - understanding
Ukraine's financing needs are also made difficult by uncertainty over the
security situation and the future structure of the state, i.e. who will be
repaying official financing going forward. Without the speedy provision of
additional official financing, the external financing gap will likely be closed
by further exchange rate adjustment and/or restructuring of external debt
liabilities - this is already happening with some corporate/bank liabilities.
It is clear that the NBU does not have sufficient FX reserves to defend the UAH
at present in any meaningful way. It may well be forced to resort to further
administrative tools to slow the UAH's descent, but these are unlikely to slow
the underlying trend, and will prove very disruptive to broader economic
activity - in effect just shifting the problem elsewhere, e.g
to the banking sector, and into fiscal space. What is now clear is that Ukraine
needs significant additional official financial support or else it will face a serious, and likely systemic, economic and financial crisis,
with likely significant longer term economic, political and geopolitical
implications.
Political outlook
Parliamentary elections on October 26 saw victory for pro-EU reform parties,
which took over 300 seats in the 450-seat Verkovna
Rada, and importantly a two thirds constitutional majority. However, hopes that
this strong reform vote would quickly see the emergence of a pro-EU reform
coalition government have been disappointed. One month after these elections
and negotiations over the formation of a new government continue. The
complication is that while the People's' Front (PF) of incumbent prime
minister, Arseniy Yatseniuk,
topped the popular vote, with around 21%, the For Petro Poroshenko
Party of President Poroshenko secured twice the
number of seats in parliament as compared to PF but with less votes, a
reflection of the dual PR/Constituency based electoral system. Yatseniuk has assumed that the fact his party topped the
popular vote gives him the mandate to form and head the government, a point
seemingly initially accepted by the Poroshenko.
Subsequent wrangling appears to have been over the allocation of ministerial
portfolios - with Poroshenko seemingly pushing for
control over more portfolios, and beyond his current right as president to
nominate the minister of foreign affairs and the head of the national security council. Particular strains have appeared over the
choice of minister of interior and speaker of parliament - the latter of which
is being coveted by the former acting President, and PF member, Oleksandr Turchynov.
Beyond dispute over ministerial portfolios there does appear to be concern with
reform parties, other than For Petro Poroshenko, as
to the potential centralising tendencies of
Potroshenko, and whether he will look to force future
constitutional changes to move more powers back to the presidency, from
parliament. The Poroshenko team, meanwhile, seem to
be nervous that a broad reform coalition, including Yatseniuk
and PF, will be difficult to manage, and it might just be easier for For Petro Poroshenko to try and
go it alone in parliament with the help of independents and perhaps one or two
of the smaller pro-EU parties. In the latter scenario Poroshenko
may be forced to scale back his plans for constitutional reform, albeit it
might make the implementation of key economic reform legislation easier in the
short term.
Moscow might be more appreciative of a narrower coalition formed around For
Petro Poroshenko, and excluding PF, and Yatseniuk. Yatseniuk appears to
have particularly grated with Moscow during his stint in office, and Poroshenko is viewed by Russia as a more compromising figure.
That said, excluding PF and some of the other pro-EU
reform parties might risk a future and possibly early backlash from the Maydan movement - and indeed from Maydan
supporters within For Petro Poroshenko.
The most likely scenario still would appear to be a broad pro-EU coalition,
including For Petro Poroshenko and PF - we would
attach a 70% probability to such a scenario. However, the delay in forming a
new coalition government is disappointing given the enormous challenges facing
the country on both the economic front, and in terms of the security situation
along its Eastern border. It is also somewhat worrying in terms of what it
suggests in terms of the future outlook for cooperation and harmony within the
coalition. It should be noted that few people we met saw much difference in the
likely economic policy orientations of For Petro Poroshenko
and PF. Several respondents we met were of the opinion that any coalition
between For Petro Poroshenko and PF would unlikely be
long lasting, perhaps surviving only through until the Spring.
The security situation
The ceasefire agreement reached in Minsk on September
5 remains fragile, with a daily stream of casualties still - over 1,000 dead
since the ceasefire was agreed, according to estimates from the OSCE. Both
sides (the Ukrainian government forces and separatists) complain of persistent
ceasefire violations on the opposing side, and of escalation. Ukrainian
government forces appeared to re-enforce positions in early November in
response to what they argued were illegal elections held in LPR and DPR on
November 2. This move, alongside the severing of fiscal transfers and banking
services to LPR and DPR appears to have been a move by the government in Kyiv
to isolate the conflict to these small regions (perhaps 2-3% of Ukraine's
territorial mass) and to allow the rest of the Ukrainian economy to normalise. Perhaps the attempt was to try and isolate the
'frozen conflict' to these specific regions limiting collateral damage to the
rest of the economy. There was also perhaps an attempt to raise the
stakes/price of further Russian intervention in Ukraine, by sending a message
to Moscow that if it wanted these Ukrainian territories, it would need to fully
maintain and pay for them - this comes at a time when the Russian economy is
already weak/suffering from the effects of weak oil prices and Western
sanctions, and struggling to cover the costs of maintaining annexed Crimea.
There was much debate during the visit over Russia's next move with respect to
Ukraine, i.e. was it content already with gains already made on the ground in
Ukraine - (annexation of Crimean and the peeling off of LPR and DPR from
Ukraine proper), or was further Russian intervention likely. The latter
intervention could comprise various forms. e.g. a moderate attempt to further
consolidate the territories of LPR and DPR, perhaps by capturing key
infrastructure assets (utilities, transport hubs), or more ambitious strategies
for forging a land corridor to Crimea or even Transdniestr.
Military strategists seemed to conclude that existing Russian/separatist
military assets in theatre were likely insufficient as yet to deliver on these
more ambitious military objectives. However, existing separatist/Russian
military assets could likely easily be increased to pose a threat that these
more ambitious military targets could be achieved.
The consensus seemed to be that any Russian decision on its next step
militarily will likely be shaped by assumptions on the ability of the Ukrainian
military to defend their existing positions, and the risks of further Western
sanctions in response. We heard varied views in terms of the capabilities of
the Ukrainian military - but there was a consensus that even if Russia could
launch a successful military campaign to deliver on its more ambitious military
objectives in Ukraine, it would struggle to sustain any such gains against
likely sustained and significant Ukrainian resistance. The point was made that
while Russia could easily enter Ukraine, it could not easily exit once it opted
for any more ambitious military agenda, with the Afghanistan comparison often
raised.
There was much debate about whether there was scope for a compromise deal to
build a most lasting peace than has proven to be the case with the Minsk ceasefire
agreement. The universal consensus from the Ukrainians we met was that room for
compromise was very limited given that their perception was that President
Putin's ultimate objective was to ensure the failure of an independent Ukraine,
and the Maydan movement. Again the consensus from the
Ukrainians we met (diverse spectrum of Russian and Ukrainian speakers from
across the country) was that the core values of the Maydan,
European values of a pluralistic market democracy, rule of law, press freedom
and human rights were worth defending at any cost, and even at the risk of the
further disintegration and splintering of Ukraine in the face of further
Russian intervention. These Ukrainians suggested that they would not give up on
the ideals of Maydan, the European and reform
orientation.
Interestingly we heard a common view that Europeans were just eager now to
sweep the Ukraine crisis under the carpet, and eager to force Ukraine to
compromise with Russia, at any cost. An example herein was pressure put on
Ukraine earlier last month to conclude a gas deal with Moscow, and forcing
Ukraine to clear debts to Gazprom, despite the fact that no financing was
provided, and indeed that this served to seriously erode Ukraine's FX position
and is partly to blame now for the pressure being felt on the UAH. The
overwhelming message from the Ukrainians we met was again that the Western
values/principals which were a cornerstone of the Maydan
were not negotiable and simply put Ukraine would not bow to Putin's
"Soviet-style" domination.
If you believe the Ukrainian interpretation that Russian intervention in
Donbas, and Crimea, is ultimately about destabilising
and undermining the Maydan reform movement, and
Ukraine's European integration, then the obvious question is does Moscow
believe it has done enough to cripple that movement already to be content with
the status quo on the ground in Donbas and Crimea? If it has, then this might
hence suggest some stabilisation. However, by the
same logic, the danger then is once the Maydan reform
movement shows signs of succeeding the risks of Russian intervention would
again pick up pace. Perhaps Russia will instead opt to keep a "hot
peace" in Donbas, with persistent but lower level conflict on the ground,
and persistent troop movements to continue to pose a threat sufficient to
distract the government in Kyiv from reform efforts, and to undermine
confidence in the economy by weighing on the chances of the Maydan
reform movement succeeding.
Simply put few people, apart from President Putin and a handful of his
advisers, know Russia's strategic and tactical game plan in Ukraine. We can
only guess.
Our own sense/read is though that the current status quo on the ground is not
sustainable, and further escalation is likely - only the scale of such
escalation is hard to determine. We say unsustainable as the economic situation
in Crimea, LPR and DPR is very difficult, and seemingly worsening. Crimea, in
particular, faces a hard winter, with limited re-supply by ferry only from
mainland Russia. The longer Russia waits also the more likely the military
balance on the ground in Ukraine will turn against it, as Ukrainian forces
regroup, re-arm and re-train. The latter could well be assisted by a likely
decision by the new Republican-dominated US Congress to vote to arm Ukraine
sometime in mid 2015 - unlikely to be vetoed by
President Obama. Perhaps the hope is that Russia still hopes that it can ensure
its strategic objectives are met in Ukraine through the political process -
e.g. by securing some form of leverage within/over a future Poroshenko
dominated ruling coalition government in Kyiv.
Moscow has indeed hinted that it would favour a broad
coalition government forged in Kyiv, inclusive of its own interests, or
representatives. This could perhaps mean that Russia would favour
the inclusion of the Opposition Party in Ukraine in any such ruling coalition.
The Opposition Party, polled just short of 10% in October's parliamentary
elections, and is led by Yuri Boyko, the former
deputy PM and minister of energy in the Yanukovych government. Historically Boiko had closer ties to Moscow, albeit has been eager to
distance himself from the separatist movement in DPR and LPR. However,
inclusion of any prominent former Yanukovych ministers in a future Ukrainian
governing coalition would be anathema to the Maydan
movement, and would significantly risk Maydan III. We
doubt that President Poroshenko would risk any such
strategy - in effect spurning a coalition with Yatseniuk
for a deal with Boiko. It is hence inconceivable at
this point that such a coalition government, favourable
to Moscow, could be formed in Kyiv, without risking further and domestic
political instability in Ukraine. Many would indeed view the latter scenario as
ultimately providing a another pretext for further
Russian intervention/annexation in/of parts of Ukraine.
Suffice to say the political and security risks and challenges facing Ukraine
are extreme.
The economy/economic policy environment
Ukraine's macro setting looks increasingly challenging in our view, with risks
moving from focus on the extent of the economic collapse caused by the conflict
in the Donbas, budget financing pressures, more to concerns over the
sustainability of the exchange rate and feed through into extreme pressures now
being felt on the banking sector.
The UAH is currently the battle ground, with the currency losing half its value
already this year, but continuing to test new lows. From one perspective the
depreciation of the UAH has helped rein in the bloated current account deficit,
from 9-10% of GDP in 2013, to a few percentage points of GDP this year, and
even with the prospect now of running a small surplus. The adjustment has also
been helped by the massive deflation of domestic demand as the recession has
bit. The problem for the UAH is that the currency is suffering a crisis of
confidence reflecting a combination of:
Concerns over the security situation in Donbas, as perhaps quite naturally each
time perceived risks grow of an escalation in violence, locals buy FX as an
assurance;
Parallel rouble weakness, which creates
"contagion" risks while undermining the REER depreciation benefit for
the UAH. Perhaps also Ukrainians are mindful that if the CBR has not been able
to stop the RUB weakening and they have over USD400bn in FX reserves then what
hope the NBU;
Recognition that the NBU has insufficient reserves to defend the UAH, and
understanding of the move to a free float;
Prior forced market unfriendly policy actions by the NBU, including
restrictions on FX withdrawals from banks, FX surrender requirements for
exporters, et al. All this puts a premium on FX, as it creates expectations of
further unfriendly administered measures;
Pressure put on Ukraine to clear gas debts to Russia and to meet foreign private
sector debt liabilities falling due in full, which both depleted FX reserves.
Official IMF financing has in effect just flown out in payments to private
creditors and to Russia for disputed gas debts.
The above crisis of confidence in the UAH is reflected in a step up in retail
buying of FX, but also much reduced roll-over ratios on the approximate USD45bn
of short term external debt falling due. In the original IMF programme the Fund assumed a rollover ratio of around 90%,
but banks indicated that this ratio may have now fallen to 70% or below. This
could suggest a net FX outflow of USD9bn through this means alone, and explains
further downward pressure on the UAH, and continued and sustained selling
pressure on the UAH. Anecdotal reports suggests that FX is still in short
supply with hoarding activity dominant - exporters delay selling FX under the
NBU's compulsory surrender requirement on expectation of further UAH weakness.
All this create a a vicious/self fulfilling cycle of UAH weakness.
Unfortunately such large scale FX weakness and scarcity,
risks creating bottlenecks throughout the payments system. Debt service
on FX borrowings spirals and become unaffordable, boosting NPLs in the banks,
and forcing broader non payments problems in the system. The latter could prove
disruptive to economic activity, deepening the recession, and offsetting any
positive uplift to net exports from the weaker UAH. For the banks higher NPLs
erode already weak capital buffers, raises recapitalisation
needs, risks bank failure and ultimately put further pressure on the sovereign
balance sheet.
Banks we spoke to found it impossible to predict exchange rate trends, with
likely binary outcomes suggested for the UAH in a 12 - 25 range. If the IMF et
al come through with more financing, and quickly, and the conflict in Donbas
eases, the currency could rally back to UAH12:USD1, but equally a failure of
either of the above positive events to transpire could see the other end of the
range hit, with potentially devastating and long term systemic problems
resulting.
Policy reform/focus
Fiscal policy has been reasonably tight in recent months, and officials were
reasonably confident that end year targets for the general budget deficit were
broadly within reach - i.e. just under 6% of GDP. Revenue performance has
surprised to the upside - tax compliance might be improving, while higher
inflation than expected might be bolstering the revenue side. Spending
restraint might reflect the considerable "fat" in the budget, and scope
still for significant cuts.
The big problem still on the fiscal side remains the bloated Naftogas deficit, not helped obviously by the deprecation
of the UAH which has totally eroded the benefits for the earlier year IMF
inspired hikes in household gas prices. Indeed, household gas prices remain at
around 15% of cost recovery levels which is again likely to push the broader
deficit out still further. My own back of the envelope calculations assumed
20bcm of gas bought by households at an average price of USD350 per tcm and supplied at 15% of cost recovery would leave a USD6bn shortfall, or around 5% of GDP. This might be a
conservative assumption given losses elsewhere from nonpayment, the costs of
technical gas, et al. But this would suggest a budget deficit for the year of
more like 11-12% of GDP on a consolidated basis, which will again put upward
pressure on the ratio of public sector debt/GDP.
The NBU has been subject to much criticism over exchange rate policy and
management, but it is difficult to be too critical given the near impossible
task the bank has faced given the extreme pressure felt on the UAH, the limited
monetary policy tools available (a reflection of years of neglect on the policy
reform front in the last), lack of FX reserves, and the broader issues which
have been driving UAH weakness as noted above. The IMF appear
generally supportive, and the NBU seems to have been getting significant
technical policy advice. The NBU seems eager to reduce administrative controls,
but clearly the impact therein is uncertain given the acutely difficult
backdrop. We did hear some consider criticism of attempts by the NBU
pre-election to try and hold the UAH around the UAH12.95 level through use of
"persuasive coordination" with local banks. Critics argued that this
smacks of the political manipulation of the NBU and exchange rate policy under
the former Yanukovych regime and undermined NBU independence and credibility.
More charitably the NBU has now detailed an impressive administrative
restructuring plan, with very ambitious targets to cut the bank's headcount
from 11,500 at present to 5,000 by 2015 (saving as much as UAH5bn which
ultimately will be transferred to the state budget), and just 1,500 by 2017. Gontareva has brought in some well respect senior managers
from the private sector to drive the process forward, and despite strong
initial opposition the process now seems to be being rolled out. Recent and new
hires in the offing are of international standard, and Gontareva
appears determined to significantly raise institutional capacity of the NBU
which is long overdue.
The NBU is also rolling out an equally ambitious reform plan for the banking
sector, tightening supervision and regulation, oversight, reporting, and
ultimately forcing rationalisation across the sector.
The NBU is enforcing new regulations to establish compulsory reporting of the
ultimate beneficial owner of banks, which they hope will help to eradicate
issues over connected party lending also help speed the recapitalisation
and resolution process in troubled banks. Already the number of banks has
reduced significantly - by 26 this year, with more to come.
Note that the NBU does seem to be emerging as a focal point and leader in the
structural reform agenda - while progress in other ministries seems to be slow-
moving as new ministers struggle against vested interests and the weight of
Soviet-era/style red tape and bureaucracy which is a haven for inefficient and
corrupt practices, but also suggest huge scope for budget savings in the future.
We heard much criticism that the Yatseniuk
administration had actually achieved little in terms of more meaningful
structural reform, in reigning in corruption, red tape and bureaucracy and in
improving the business environment. They would perhaps argue that they are new
in office still, were an interim acting administration with a limited mandate
given the move to early elections, while the war in the East diverted focus
away from reform. Critics still argue that these are poor excuses and the war
in the East just accentuates the need for radical reform, to cut excess
government spending, justifies budget austerity to help divert resources to the
war effort.
Both the Poroshenko presidency and the Yatseniuk acting government are promising more radical reform
once the new administration is formed. Poroshenko has
unveiled a reform plan for 2020 (a 60-odd page programme),
targeting to have Ukraine prepared for EU membership by this date. Yatseniuk has detailed a much narrower reform plan of a few
pages. The two sides are still trying to work the two documents together
towards a common coalition agreement.
Relations with the IMF/official creditors
An IMF technical mission arrived in Kyiv on November 11 and is slated to remain
until November 25 to undertake preparatory work on the latest (2nd) review
under the USD17bn IMF SBA. The decision to undertake a technical review, rather
than a formal review mission reflected uncertainty over the outcome of
parliamentary elections and whether a new government would be in place and
would be able to discuss its new policy programme
with the IMF. The assumption was that a second mission would be dispatched to
Kyiv prior to year end, assuming that a new government was formed speedily in
November, and then able to negotiate the completion of the latest review. As
is, and with no government yet approved, it seems unlikely that a return IMF
mission can be scheduled in time to allow completion of the review, and in time
for the last IMF board meeting in December. It now seems more likely that the
IMF board will only meet to agree the completion of the latest review and any
credit augmentation or dispersal, later in January, and presumably after the
Orthodox Christmas break, i.e. in mid-late January. Note that this is also contingent
on agreement over completion of the review and possible prior actions,
including passage of the budget for 2015. The latter document, by law, should
have been tabled before parliament in Mid-September, but is yet to be
forthcoming.
Our sense is that the IMF is understanding that the
original IMF programme is now in need of extensive
review, revision, and augmentation. Recent extreme selling pressure on the
exchange rate, and reserve depletion, suggests that large external financing
gaps have appeared which were not envisaged in the original programme.
Quantifying these is difficult, especially given that the security situation is
almost impossible to call. NBU governor Gontareva has
noted that only USD4.6bn of the original USD17bn SBA credits have been
disbursed, suggesting that USD14bn is still available for disbursement. The
problem is that the original SBA was front loaded in terms of conditionality
and backloaded in terms of disbursements. One
potential solution would be to re-profile disbursements, bringing more forward
- the second review under the SBA, in any event, combined the 3rd and 4th
reviews, with the next disbursement slated to total USD2.6bn. This is now
likely too small to "touch the sides" and especially if it is only
forthcoming in late January by which time NBU reserves may have fallen to less
than USD10bn, I.e. just over one month of import cover. The real problem now is
that while the UAH might appear cheap from a trade/current account perspective,
it is currently suffering from a broader crisis of confidence. Just bringing
disbursements forward may not be enough, and the market might well need a
bigger ticket confidence booster in terms of the re-sizing of the overall programme. Government officials indicated that they thought
that another USD10-15bn in IFI credits was likely now needed, and we would tend
to concur, and especially now given the holes appearing in the capital account
and with likely substantial needs now in terms of bank recapitalisation.
Overall we think that an enhanced IMF programme of
USD30bn or so should be able to instil some
confidence. Critics may well respond though that this may still not help when
weak confidence is driven partially also by uncertainties in terms of the
security situation which is hardly likely to disappear, even with a revamped
financially augmented programme. That said without
further Western financial support, financial and economic collapse - raising
systemic issues - will be likely, which is hardly likely to make the security
situation easier, arguably it could accentuate security risks by depleting
focus and resources on national defence.
IMF shareholders are likely still mindful of past failed IMF programmes for Ukraine, and a poor track record of
compliance prior to the current programme. Ownership
of the current programme by Ukraine's political and
policy elite does, however, appear much stronger this time around while the population appear much more willing to bite the reform
bullet in the interests of guaranteeing Ukrainian statehood. Arguably it is now
a case of now or never in terms of prospects for a Ukrainian government to
deliver on a meaningful and indeed potentially transformational reform agenda.
It is, however still unclear in my mind whether key
IMF shareholders get this. Also note that another potential issue is now
appearing in the form of rising public sector indebtedness, and the growing
weight of official (multilateral and bilateral) lending in the total - after
the prospect of USD30bn in IMF disbursements, and with the ratio of public
sector debt/GDP also at risk now of hitting 70% at the end of 2014, and perhaps
over 80% in 2015. This appears unsustainably high in the Ukrainian context and
might weigh on shareholders' willingness to commit larger financial sums to Ukraine
- it could well spur another debate about PSI, or burden sharing domestically
in Ukraine to its own oligarchic elites.
Beyond the IMF, the Ukrainian government has requested a further EUR2bn in
loans from the EU, on top of an existing USD1.6bn facility - of which USD860m
has already been disbursed. This EU money has not yet been agreed upon, but
would require approval of the 2015 budget, sign off from the IMF on the latest
review under the SBA, and likely also agreement from the European Parliament. The
latter could take some considerable time, and might not be forthcoming until
mid-2015.
Similarly debate continues over the US extending Ukraine another loan
guarantee, in addition to the USD1bn issued earlier this year. There has been
discussion of perhaps increasing the size of such issuance, perhaps to several
billion dollars in several tranches. A looming constraint though now is the
underlying cost of risk insurance paid for by the US government as part of this
facility for Ukraine, which is becoming precipitously high, and might well
raise concerns in Congress - it may also suggest that it might make more sense
to simply extend the support facility as grant aid, albeit this would then eat
into grant aid budgets elsewhere.
There is also discussion on-going of a Ukrainian donor's conference in 2015 -
perhaps in February, and this could serve as a focal point for EU, US and
indeed IMF financing augmentation initiatives. The danger there is that this
puts off talk of more immediate efforts to "upsize" financial support
to Ukraine when the deteriorating situation on the ground would suggest that
much more urgency is needed. We would still argue that the longer the West
leaves it in terms of deciding on committing further loans to Ukraine, the
greater the risk of further UAH weakness and damage to the banking sector and
broader economy which will have much longer term impact. Ultimately delaying
upsizing existing support could ultimately increase the longer term cost to the
West of supporting the West.
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