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Lilia ShevtsovaThe Kremlin Is WinningHow the West uses a collection of “myths” about Russia
to deceive itself about its own impotence. Ukraine is a victim of both the Russian System’s
struggle for survival and the West’s inability to protect the international
legal space. For the West, ending this confrontation may prove to be even more
agonizing than ending the Cold War, because: ·
the West is
refusing to recognize that this is not a regional crisis, but a clash of
opposing systems; ·
the West has
lost the ability to contain a civilizational adversary; ·
the Kremlin
has created self-protection mechanisms within Western societies; ·
the liberal
democracies don’t see any need to fight for norms in their foreign
policies; ·
they believe
the Russian ruling elite is less risk-averse than the aged and decrepit Soviet
leadership, but they’re still not sure how risk-averse; ·
the system
of global governance, which was based on the outcome of World War II, no longer
fits today’s world; ·
Russia’s
aggression against Ukraine has blossomed into a crisis of Ukrainian statehood; Francois Hollande’s and Angela Merkel’s urgent mission
to broker a deal in east Ukraine points to Western fears (quite justified) that
the war in Ukraine will dismantle European and global stability, as well as
bringing about the collapse of the international governance system (already in
an advanced state of paralysis). However these peace overtures end, we should
focus on the set of beliefs that contributed to the emergence of this crisis,
complicate its resolution, and distort the real picture of the challenges
facing the world. Let’s examine some of the currently popular myths about the
standoff between Russia and the West in Ukraine. 1. Is it Putin or the System? Many believe that Putin and his recklessness are to
blame for everything. The Russian President probably enjoys reading essays that
purport to analyze his psyche and his demonic
traits. It’s certainly true that Putin flipped over the global chessboard
without fully appreciating or anticipating the consequences. But how much
control does he really have over the Kremlin and Russian developments more
broadly? Guillermo O’Donnell coined the term “impotent omnipotence” to describe
personalized regimes. I think the term applies to the rule of Russia as well.
Despite his vast powers, the Russian leader is increasingly dependent on his
team’s loyalty and his approval ratings. Both of these factors are treacherous.
Putin is already having trouble maintaining stability in Russia. The war in
Ukraine has become a trap that he has no idea how to extract himself from. If
Putin is forced to turn Russia into a fortress in order to consolidate the
people around the Kremlin, what does this say about his power and his freedom
of action? Putin’s diminished administrative capabilities will
prompt him to take extreme steps to preserve his power. But he will no longer
be able to bottle the genies that escaped as a result of his actions. If we
persist in believing that Putin is the key problem, we will neglect the logic
of the Russian System of which he is the mere personification. Regime change
will become the System’s most likely response to crisis. Many Putinologists
would welcome this outcome because they fail to realize what lies ahead. The
truth is that any Putin successor will continue on the course of suicidal
statecraft, as long as the decaying personalized power system remains in place.
There is, however, a dramatic dilemma: the longer Putin stays in the
Kremlin, the deeper the abyss becomes into which he is pushing Russia. 2. Humiliation as a Survival
Strategy Many Russia hands explain current events as the result
of the humiliation that Russia long suffered at the hands of the West. They
believe that Russia is currently acting out its Weimar syndrome, and that the
West is still foolishly refusing to grant Russia a proper place on the world
stage. This “humiliation theory”, if we were to subscribe to it, would suggest
a number of conclusions that are not immediately obvious even to many of its proponents. First, it implies that the Russian people carry a
special gene that precludes them from living in a rule of law state. This is,
of course, a racist way of looking at Russians. Let me remind you that the
Russian elite in fact came forward with this hypocritical dichotomy: it talks
of humiliation on one hand and Western decay on the other. But how can a feeble
and decaying power humiliate anyone? And why do Western observers readily
repeat this Kremlin mantra? Second, Western recognition of the idea that Russia
needs spheres of influence to compensate for its humiliations runs counter not
only to international legal norms but is also dismissive of the people whose
countries are to become a soothing balm for the Kremlin’s wounded ego. There is
a bitter irony that no one who wants to keep the war under control, including
the Kremlin, desires further military escalation that would raise the price
of the conflict. However, those who urge the West not to provide military aid
to Ukraine, lest they provoke further Russian aggression, are not only denying
Ukrainians their right to self-defense (since we are taking about defensive
military aid here); they are also acquiescing to (and in this way provoking)
aggression from one state against its neighbor. It’s hard to see how this makes
Ukraine anything but a second-class nation that should be content with its
role: that of a bargaining chip in a game played by its betters. “We’ll give
you Ukraine, and you give us a hand on Iran.” Third, if the mythology of humiliation has become the
rallying cry for the Russian elite, and indeed its most important reason for
retaining power, then how can the West possibly alleviate that humiliation? So
far, every Western attempt to satisfy the Kremlin’s demands has only prompted it
to make new ones. 3. How to Turn Weakness into
Strength Many say Russia is waging the war in Ukraine to acquire
more territory. But really, the Kremlin doesn’t need new territory—that was the
old tactic the Russian Empire used to preserve itself. The Kremlin now has a
modified and updated version of this tactic: it uses threats of takeovers and
alternative forms of war (customs, trade, information/cyber) as instruments of
intimidation and blackmail. The Kremlin doesn’t actually need Donbas; it would
just become another burden on the beleaguered Russian budget. The two
pro-Russian separatist offensives in August 2014 and January 2015 were supposed
to force Kiev (and the West as well) to accept Moscow’s conditions not only for
a peace in Ukraine but also for the re-organization of the post-Soviet space.
Moscow, as Putin himself admits, would be most satisfied with the scenario
under which the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics rejoin Ukraine as
independent subjects accountable to Moscow. First, this would absolve Russia of
responsibility for a region in the midst of a humanitarian disaster. Second,
this would undermine the Ukrainian state from within. In brief, for the Kremlin, the turn to expansionism is
more of a pressure release valve and a way to compensate for its weaknesses in
other areas (including the economy), rather than an actual method of
territorial acquisition. Thus the Western pragmatists preferred course of
accommodation won’t satisfy the Kremlin’s appetites but will instead make them
grow. “If they retreat, we will advance”—that’s the logic of the system. 4. The Russian Elite as Rational
Actors Quite a few Western observers support making
concessions to Moscow, the hope being that these concessions will bring it back
to the negotiating table, allowing the West to lift the sanctions, after which
everyone will happily return to business as usual. They couldn’t be more wrong!
For the West, restraint, compromise, and keeping promises are all attributes
one can expect to find in a rational actor; the Russian political elite,
however, interpret these attributes as signs of weakness. For them, rational behavior
includes unpredictability, tolerance for the use of force, and a callous
disregard for human lives in the service of their objective. This is exactly
the reason why the Kremlin cannot afford to cave in the face of sanctions, even
if doing so risks economic collapse. The absence of external restraints (along
with the lack of internal ones, such as independent institutions and strong
public opinion) will drive the Kremlin toward even riskier experiments in
self-affirmation. The Western pundits are right about one thing: the
Kremlin is afraid that any concession on the Russian part would trigger a
Western offensive. But so far, there have only been Western concessions,
which have triggered the Kremlin to push further. And one
can’t help but admire the skill of the Russian political class in playing mind
games: it has persuaded the West that humiliating Russia would have dire
consequences, and that back-tracking is not an option. However, those who think
that Western resolve would only harden the Kremlin’s position could be wrong.
Perhaps, at the outset, the Kremlin would indeed try to test the West’s limits.
But the Soviet-era experience shows us that the Russian personalized regime as
a rule respects force and will abide by enforceable agreements.
On the contrary, the absence of external restraints encourages recklessness,
which endangers the very existence of a system that has no mechanisms for
self-correction or for assessing risk. As the West has showed more and more
signs of acquiescence, the Kremlin has become more and more of a loose cannon. We will soon see, however, that Russians have
exhausted their tolerance for human losses. They will only support a bloodless
and cost-free mobilization. People supported Crimea because it bought them
national self-affirmation on the cheap, but neither the majority of the elite
nor the majority of the people will support a protracted war with Ukraine, let
alone the West, because they are not ready to pay for it. Here is one more example of the differences between the
thinking patterns in Russia and the West. The West considers tensions and
crises in neighboring countries as a threat to the stability of liberal
democracies. The Kremlin, for its part, is looking forward to the collapse of
the Ukrainian economy and is doing all it can to bring it about, because that
would give it more room for tactical maneuvering. 5. Glory to Geopolitics! Many experts in Russia and the West alike assert that
Ukraine has become an arena for a geopolitical clash between Russia and the West.
This doesn’t play as well today in Germany, where geopolitics was once used to
justify Hitler’s revanchism and prove the inevitability of a clash between
“geographic spaces” and the domination of great powers. In the current
situation, geopolitics is used to prove the inevitability of confrontation
between Russia and the West and to blame the West for it. So if you come across
geopolitical terms in discussions of current events, you should know what they
really mean. 6. War or Peace? Blurring the borders between war and peace is an ideal
approach for ensuring the survival of the Russian System. Moscow has been able
to: support the separatists, directly participate in combat, and play the role
of a mediator and arbiter in peace talks—all at the same time! Both the Ukrainians and the West have been forced to
reconcile themselves with these blurred borders and roles so as not to irritate
Moscow and provoke even more aggression. Failing to do so would compel Ukraine
to face facts and declare a state of war. But Kiev is not prepared to do this:
its military would not withstand a direct clash with the full force of the
Russian army. The Ukrainians also fear that declaring a state of war with
Russia would hinder its receipt of Western aid. The West, for its part, is even
more reluctant than Ukraine to label Russia’s behavior as war, since doing so
would cast everything back in time to the bipolar world and the nuclear
standoff. The West is not ready to do this now. But preserving the hybrid nature and blurred lines of
this war disorients the world, undermines moral principles, and demoralizes
Western and global institutions, forcing them into playing the Kremlin’s “Let’s
Pretend!” game. It also creates the possibility that the same process will be
played out elsewhere, since the global system has shown that it is not prepared
to react to this geopolitical ambiguity. The Kremlin’s participation in the February 2015
efforts to bring peace points to its fears that the blurred lines between war
and peace might give way to a genuine military conflict with the West. But the
history of the September 2014 Minsk agreements should show us that Moscow can
use pauses in the fighting to its advantage in order to force Ukraine to make
peace on Russia’s own terms. 7. Western Peaceniks The Soviet Union dredged up a whole host of
peace-loving individuals, often referred to as “peaceniks”, to assist in its
struggle against the West and to mercilessly expose the pitfalls of capitalism
and its militarism. Today one could see a new generation of Western peaceniks,
who scare us with visions of an impending Armageddon and a new Cold War—that
is, unless the West compromises with the Kremlin. Now, this is not to say that
the new crop of peaceniks is connected to the Kremlin; indeed they apparently
genuinely believe in what they say! They genuinely believe that the West should
make a deal with Putin immediately, accept Russia’s right to spheres of
influence, halt the West’s march toward Russia’s border, and join Russia in the
struggle for peace. This, at any rate, is what we hear from the sixty long-time
German proponents of Östpolitik who signed a letter in support of making a
deal with the Kremlin: “Show greater understanding for Russian fears” (“Another
war in Europe? Not in our name”). Many American analysts believe in this as
well. They feel the need to tell both Russia’s neighbors and even the Russians
themselves: “Don’t think of jumping on the Western bandwagon!” Now, we shouldn’t dismiss the claim that the current
standoff could indeed morph into a harsh confrontation. But let me ask the
peaceniks, “You defended the idea of the “reset” long after its sell-by date;
why weren’t you warning us of the impending Armageddon then? Can’t you see that
the Kremlin interpreted the drumbeat of Western compromise during the reset as
a sign of impotence? Can you guarantee that a new deal would not end in a
similar fiasco? In any event, the Western refrain that there is no
military solution to the Ukraine crisis has certainly done nothing to slow
things down over the past year. To the contrary, so far Moscow has managed to
impose its version of peace through its own military solution! 8. How the Western Pragmatists
Disorient Both the West and Moscow Quite a few Western observers support the Kremlin’s
laundry list of demands for Ukraine: federalization, non-aligned status, and
negotiations with the separatists as sovereign political subjects, which would
mean returning to the Yalta world order. Recently, these voices have called for
dialogue between the EU and the Eurasian Union, one that would allow Ukraine
and other neighboring states to co-exist in two spheres of influence (also
supported by Moscow). Over time this would of course be reduced to one sphere
of influence—and we all know which sphere this means. Some Western experts have
also begun to work out a return to limited sovereignty in one form or another.
But do these people really think Russia would honor its agreements? Or that a
return to the Yalta system will bring peace to Ukraine? What naivety! The Western pragmatists are doing a disservice not
just to the West but to Moscow as well. First, they are sowing confusion in the
West about what is really happening in Russia. They claim that most Russians
support Putin and are unlikely to abandon him. In truth, the situation in
Russia is getting more complicated—something that isn’t captured in Putin’s
approval ratings. (And remember, when the Soviet Communist Party fell, it had
99 percent approval; there’s no reason to think Putin’s sky-high numbers are any
more meaningful in the present context.) The pragmatists are also confusing the Kremlin, by
convincing them that the West will stomach just about anything that it dishes
out. Indeed this false confidence has guided the Kremlin in its suicidal
actions. I think the West’s sanctions surprised Putin, who had put too much
stock in the arguments made by the Western accommodators. In this sense, the
pragmatists share some of the blame for the Ukraine crisis. 9. Ukraine as the Means The Merkel-Hollande quest for peace and the
negotiations with Moscow have confirmed the Kremlin’s belief that it can exert
pressure on the West by raising the stakes, by pretending, by bluffing, and by
eking out tactical advantages even as it heads inexorably toward strategic
defeat. During the past few weeks we have borne witness to the Kremlin’s
efforts to impose peace on its own terms by intentionally escalating tensions
in eastern Ukraine, apparently hoping that not only Kiev but also the West
would lose its nerve and back down as it has so often done in the past. On the
heels of last month’s separatist offensive in Donbas, which threatened to
encircle and destroy the Ukrainian troops at Debaltsevo, Putin followed up with
a peace proposal directed first Poroshenko and then to Merkel and Hollande. The
proposals looked like an irresistible ultimatum; the events on the ground made
it clear that rejection would mean Russia would forge ahead with “peace” in the
manner and time of its own choosing. As the Western adherents of accommodation with the
Kremlin begged their nation’s leaders to “understand” the Kremlin and make a
“new deal” with it on Moscow’s terms to avert “a New Cold War” , the Kremlin
was pushing forward. One could thus argue that it wasn’t just Putin’s mood but
the accommodators dire warnings that helped create the impression that the West
was ready to make a trade. The Kremlin’s strategists should probably even thank
the “peaceniki” who argued things like: “the Russian leaders are
unlikely to give ground, even if it means absorbing huge costs”, or that
Western military aid could “distract [Ukraine] from the vital task of
reconstruction.” Even as Merkel and Hollande were still on their peace
mission, the Kremlin continued to complain about the West’s (and primarily
America’s) intent to encircle Russia. “Russia is not going to step back” was
the refrain sounded by Putin and Lavrov during the peace negotiations. As Putin
told the Congress of the Russian Trade Unions, Russia refuses to live “in a state of semi-occupation.” Here’s Lavrov: “Our Western colleagues [have set
on a course of] preserving their domination in world affairs by all possible
means, on seizing the geopolitical space in Europe. . . . At each stage of the
crisis’s development, our American colleagues, and under their influence, also
the European Union, have been taking steps leading to escalation.” Peaceful statements, aren’t they? The Kremlin has
certainly been trying to test Merkel-Hollande-Obama’s readiness for “diplomatic
solutions.” It is not only continuing to repeat its view on the origins of the
Ukraine crisis (that it was a Western-supported coup); it is also continuing to
put forward its proposal for overcoming the crisis: rewriting Ukraine’s
constitution to take into account, as Putin puts it, the “positive values and
genuine interests of Ukraine.” The latter means that Moscow will explain
Ukrainians what their “genuine interests” are. In addition, the Kremlin insists
that Ukraine negotiate directly with the separatists and has offered security
guarantees to Ukraine. It’s hard to tell whether we ought to take this
as confirmation of the Kremlin’s disastrous sense of irony, or its confidence
that the West will be forced to swallow this deal whole. In short, the Kremlin has confirmed that it will
continue to seek not only to limit Ukraine’s sovereignty but also to influence
its form of government and statehood. Moreover, as Putin admitted to Al Ahram, the
“Ukraine crisis” is not really about Ukraine at all: “It has emerged in
response to the attempts of the USA and its Western allies who considered
themselves ‘winners’ of the Cold War to impose their will everywhere.” In Munich, Lavrov acknowledged that Ukraine is the
instrument that will force the West to “negotiate a new security system on the
basis of re-confirming the Helsinki principles.” In the Kremlin’s view this
means readjusting the world order in such a way as to give Russia a more
dignified role in the world. The problem is that the Kremlin will never find
any Western concession regarding this order satisfactory, because the basis of
its survival is the reproduction of the Weimar Syndrome, which depends on a
constant demand for “deliverables” (the delivery of which must of course always
be in some way unsatisfactory—in order to maintain the “besieged fortress”).
Ukraine, unfortunately, has become a way for the Kremlin to sustain this
process and thus reproduce itself. 10. Peace, or Imitation Peace? The dramatic marathon summit of the “Normandy Four”
(Merkel, Hollande, Putin, and Poroshenko) in Minsk, which was supposed to
broker a ceasefire in Eastern Ukraine, ended in the failure to reach a solution
that will guarantee a durable ceasefire and a true path to peace. The documents
the four leaders produced represent a tradeoff: Ukraine accepts the Kremlin’s
idea for a political framework in exchange for the Kremlin’s promise to
deescalate. Lavrov’s comments on the negotiations in the middle of the previous
night were “Super!”, while Poroshenko, looking gloomy, said “Not so good”—which
tells us all we need to know about the two sides’ differing understandings of
success and failure in the talks. The results of these Minsk-2 talks are essentially an
attempt to revive the September Minsk-1 agreement. That agreement was dead the
moment it was born because the sides couldn’t agree on the political framework,
and because there were no strong enforcement mechanisms. Minsk-2, with all
defects of its predecessor, reflects broad political concessions. The European
tandem has accepted the Kremlin’s formula: to maintain Ukrainian territorial
integrity, but with autonomy for the separatist “republics”, which will gain
broad rights, including the right to keep their militias and to maintain a
relationship with Russia. The Ukrainian constitution will have to be changed in
order to secure the above-mentioned “decentralization agreed with
representatives of the enclaves.” The Kremlin, in short, won: it forced Ukraine to “take
back” the separatist “republics” and bear responsibility for their restoration,
thus giving the Kremlin an instrument for undermining Ukrainian statehood from
within. In order to sweeten this pill for Kiev, the European tandem promised
“support for restoring the banking system in the areas of conflict, possibly
through building an intentional mechanism to allow payments.” (How very
thoughtful!) Moscow will even take part in the economic negotiations between
the EU-Ukraine in order to make sure that its “concerns” are satisfied. To
this, all one can say is “Bravo, Putin!” He has achieved more than anyone could
have imagined! If Kiev follows this agreement, we will have a weird, barely
sustainable state whose stability will depend on the mood of its neighbor. This
neighbor, in fact, will control parts of the Ukrainian state itself and will
have ample possibilities to cut its blood vessels from the inside out. The negotiators, however, have failed to secure the
two the most important elements of a ceasefire that could have guaranteed the
end of violence in the Ukrainian east: withdrawal of the “foreign troops” and
heavy weapons, and control over the Russia-Ukraine border. Withdrawal will be
implemented under OSCE control, which has already proved to be feckless.
Furthermore, the border will be controlled “in accordance with agreements with
the representatives of the Donetsk and Luhansk republics” The latter means that
the Ukrainian border with Russia remains open. A state can’t be considered
viable if it has open (unsecured) boarder with a neighboring state, especially
in the context of a military conflict. True, the participants of the negotiations have
interpreted them in a different way: Poroshenko argues that there will be no
“federalization” or “ autonomy” for the separatists; the latter believe that
nothing will be decided without their consent. Otherwise, War! This is hardly a
“consensus” that will make the truce work. Especially, when the mechanism for
enforcing it is unconvincing: the same OSCE that failed to guarantee Minsk-1
and the promise to build a “controlling Normandy format.” We already know what
the Normandy format produces! Thus, disaster again—an eminently predictable
consequence of the format and of the illusions of accommodation. The European tandem
desperately tried to find at least a temporary solution, a “middle way”
acceptable to both the Kremlin and Kiev. But how can you reconcile
irreconcilable principles? In such a situation, the “middle way” looks like
acquiescence to the stronger party. Let’s hope that the Western leaders will adequately
assess the situation and its repercussions. In fact, these negotiations were
not about the ceasefire terms only; they were about acceptance or rejection of
the right of strong powers to dictate rules and enforce their own understanding
of what constitutes a “dignified” role for themselves. So far, the West has
failed to persuade the Kremlin stop looking for a balm for its Weimar syndrome.
In fact, the Minsk talks may persuade it to push the West even harder. The problem with the West’s approach is that it is
trying to pursue a peace agenda using postmodern forms—economic enforcement and
the threat of military aid for Ukraine—that the key actor in this war does not
seem to take seriously. This actor still believes that the price of backing
down would be higher than the price it must currently pay both at home and
internationally. The Minsk-2 agreement will show us whether the Kremlin
is ready to reject the war tactic as something that is ultimately disastrous
for its survival. We won’t have to wait long for an answer. In order for the
Kremlin to deescalate, three conditions have to obtain: the West will have to
acquire some form of powerful leverage that will give Moscow an incentive to
back down; the Kremlin will have to believe that the war will undermine its
domestic potential; and Ukraine will have to demonstrate that it is committed
to building a new rule of law state that leaves no opportunities for meddling
by neighbors (weakness invites interference). But if the West is ready to
support a “middle way” that is acceptable to the Kremlin, why should it change
its tactics? In any case, there is zero chance of a miracle. Even
if Moscow decides to deescalate militarily, it will try to contain the West by
other means—either in Ukraine or elsewhere. There are plenty of such means at
the Kremlin’s disposal, including the economic garrote, cooptation of Ukraine’s
oligarchs, buying off the deputies of the Rada and the government, driving a
deeper wedge between the factions of the Ukrainian ruling group, and even just
sitting back and waiting for Ukraine’s economy to tank on its own. A “peaceful”
subjugation could be even more treacherous for Ukraine, and the current truce
creates the possibility that Moscow could shift to using any of a number of
non-military levers. Don’t expect the Kremlin to turn around suddenly and
redeem itself of its own accord. While the Kremlin is indeed sprinting headlong
toward ultimate strategic defeat, some in Russia and beyond are still willing
to finish the race. If anyone in the West thinks that now is the time to relax
and forget about Ukraine for a while, they should think again. It’s high time that the West understood how far the
Russian System is willing to go to survive. And it’s high time it roused itself
from its postmodern dreams of accommodation and compromise. Otherwise, the
“mythologists” will win the day once again, and bring us closer to the
catastrophe they allegedly are trying to avert. |